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ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Government regulation increasingly pervades post-industrial
American society.' As regulations proliferate, their enforcement
requires more government inspection of formerly private activ-
ity.2 Some of the regulated subjects have resisted such inspection,
and the fourth amendment 3 provides them with a partial defense
by limiting the ways government can intrude upon individual pri-
vacy. 4  This tension between regulatory inspections and the
fourth amendment has created a problem-how to further the
important public policies served by inspection 5 without unduly
disrupting individual privacy.
The Supreme Court recently attempted to resolve this
dilemma in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 6 the latest of the Court's
struggles 7 with the application of the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement to inspections and administrative searches. The
See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.);
id. at 339 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967);
J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 245 (1966).
2 J. LANDYNSKI, supra note I, at 245; see also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 339
(1971) (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See notes 10-15 and accompanying text infra.
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533, 537 (1967); Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 353-54 (1974).
6 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
7 Previous cases have dealt with the warrant requirement in various contexts. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (checkpoint stop by border patrol);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of automobile); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (inspection of gun dealer's business premises);
Wyman v..James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visit to welfare recipient); Colonnade Cater-
ing Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspection of liquor dealer's business prem-
ises); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (inspection of warehouse for fire code
violations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (inspection of residence for
housing code violations); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (inspection of residence
for housing code violations).
" This Note will use the terms "inspection" and "administrative search" interchange-
ably in referring to routine information-gathering procedures that select their targets
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Court's reasoning in these cases is neither consistent nor satisfac-
tory.9 In attempting to avoid unnecessary limitations on impor-
tant inspection programs while adequately protecting privacy
interests, the Court has obscured the warrant requirement's im-
pact on these programs. This uncertainty may ultimately prove
more harmful than an undesirable result in any given case.
This Note will analyze the Court's responses to the conflict
between the need to inspect and the right to privacy. This inquiry
will show that, rather than focusing on the warrant requirement,
the Court should simply examine the reasonableness of particular
inspection programs. The proposed approach would solve the
problem, not through the judiciary's efforts, but through those of
the legislators and administrators who initiated the inspection
programs and can better evaluate the policies underlying them.
I
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT METHODOLOGY
The fourth amendment protects individual privacy against
government intrusion 10 by limiting entries into areas where "a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.""I Although many inspection programs affect only
commercial enterprises and not individuals directly, the amend-
ment applies equally to both types of searches. 12 Government in-
spections will therefore almost always encounter fourth amend-
ment restrictions.' 3 The Barlow's Court made this all the more
randomly from predetermined categories of persons or places, as distinguished from es-
sentially ad hoc information-gathering procedures aimed at particular persons or places in
particular situations. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978); In re Brickner, 453
F. Supp. 91, 93 (E.D. Wis. 1978); United States v. Piner, 452 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 n.9 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46
GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 529, 571 (1978) (government power "most frightening" when directed
at particular individuals rather than groups of citizens or citizenry as a whole).
9 See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lauyering,
48 IND. L. J. 329, 329 (1973) ("The fourth amendment cases are a messi").
10 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
'1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
12 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
l But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), where the Court held that a welfare
home visit was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 317. The
Court emphasized that such visits were very different from searches "in the traditional
criminal law context," and that a recipient's refusal to permit them was not a criminal act.
Id. But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) ("It is surely anomalous to
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likely by holding that an individual can retain his expectation of
privacy as against the government even when he has surrendered
it as against other individuals.1
4
The fourth amendment, however, expressly prohibits only
"unreasonable" searches. 15  In Camara v. Municipal Court,' 6 the
Supreme Court sought to determine the reasonableness of a par-
ticular search '7 by balancing the government's interest in conduct-
ing the search and the individual's interest in protecting his pri-
vacy.' 8  If the interests of the individual outweigh those of the
government, the search is unreasonable and therefore constitu-
tionally impermissible.
But the fourth amendment also provides that search warrants
may issue only on probable cause. 19 As applied by the Supreme
Court, this provision in the amendment's second clause has un-
necessarily complicated the law. Interpreting the "reasonableness"
requirement of the amendment's first clause, the Supreme Court
has held that, apart from certain exceptional classes of cases, a
warrantless search is inherently unreasonable. ° In most cases,
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.") Perhaps sensing the
weakness of this distinction, the Wyman Court offered a second ground for its holding-if
home visits were searches, they were nevertheless reasonable and thus constitutionally
permissible. 400 U.S. at 318.
14 436 U.S. at 314-15.
" See note 3 supra. Unreasonable searches and seizures include those that are unjus-
tified (see, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979) (stopping motorist to check
license constitutionally impermissible without articulable and reasonable suspicion)), arbi-
trary (see, e.g., Giancana v. Johnson, No. 63 C 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (continuous surveillance
by FBI agents "arbitrary intrusion into plaintiff's right of privacy"), rev'd on other grounds,
335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), discussed in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 213-14 (4th ed. 1974)), or unduly intrusive (see, e.g., Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (minor intrusion into body to test blood alcohol level per-
missible under strictly limited conditions, but different results possible if "more substantial
intrusions" or if under different conditions)). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 359,
411.
One member of the Court has suggested that the government first employ "informa-
tional sources less drastic than an invasion of the privacy of the home" in order to avoid
unreasonable searches. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 342-43 (1971) (dissenting opin-
ion, Marshall, J.). The majority has rejected this view. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 559 (1978); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
16 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17 Id. at 536-37.
18 Id. at 532-35.
19 See note 3 supra.
20 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See also Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
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the government can intrude on an individual's privacy only after
obtaining a search warrant.
By incorporating the second clause of the amendment into
the first, the Court has shifted the focus from reasonableness to
probable cause.2 ' Under this conceptual framework a search is
reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, only if
probable cause existed to issue a warrant.22  The Court has con-
tinued to balance the government's interest in conducting the
search against the individual's interest in protecting his privacy,
but this inquiry now determines whether a warrant should issue,
not whether the search may be conducted without one.23
Critics have sharply attacked the rule that warrantless
searches are inherently unreasonable.24 These assaults have
drawn support from the history and structure of the fourth
amendment2 5 and the undesirable effects of the rule, especially in
the context of administrative searches. 26  The amendment's his-
tory demonstrates the Framers' concern for the abuse of search
warrants, not warrantless searches.27 Although the second clause
21 One commentator, arguing in favor of the Court's approach, has identified three
possible interpretations of the relationship between the two clauses:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant requirements
specified in the second clause; (2) that the first clause provides an additional
restriction by implying that some searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore
not permissible, even when made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause
provides an additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find some
searches "reasonable" even when carried out without warrant.
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 42-43 (emphasis in original). The Court appears to have
adopted the first of these three interpretations. See text accompanying note 20 supra. Cf
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (intrusion so shocking that it violates due pro-
cess); Adams v. State, 299 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. 1973) (despite authorization by court, opera-
tion to remove bullet prohibited by fourth amendment as unreasonable). The Court's ap-
proach has been attacked on numerous occasions. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text
infra.
22 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
23 Id. at 534-35. See also Grano, Foreword-Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69
J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 445 (1978) (comparing approaches of majority and dissent
in Barlow's).
24 One commentator has severely criticized the Court's construction of the amendment,
saying that it stands the fourth amendment "on its head." T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24 (1969).
25 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 326-28 (1978) (dissenting opinion, Stevens,
J.); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547-48, 554-55 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Clark,
J.); T. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 21.
2' Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 329-34 (1978) (dissenting opinion, Stevens,
J.); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Clark, J.).
27 See T. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 41.
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of the amendment carefully limits the circumstances under which
a warrant may issue, it does not expressly require a warrant for all
searches.2 8  Warrantless searches are explicitly limited only by the
requirement in the first clause that they not be unreasonable.
29
The judicially created rule that warrantless searches are inherently
unreasonable has brought administrative searches, which had not
traditionally required warrants,3 0 within the scope of the warrant
clause. This rule has burdened inspection programs, while giving
little protection to individual privacy. In extending the warrant
requirement to administrative searches, the Supreme Court simul-
taneously diluted the meaning of probable cause in order to make
these searches possible.
Traditionally, probable cause exists if "the facts and cir-
cumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he has]
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
item or condition he seeks is in the place he intends to search.31
If this were the standard for administrative searches, very few
would occur because administrative searches by definition 3 2 focus
on broad groups or areas, not on specific persons or places. For
example, the Camara Court concluded that the effective enforce-
ment of housing codes requires periodic inspections of all resi-
dences within particular geographic areas. 33  Yet without some
.8 See note 3 supra.
2' Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.);
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 120 (1937).
Arguments concerning the interpretation of the fourth amendment based on its his-
tory and structure are obscured by the unusual manner in which Congress adopted it. The
House of Representatives "never ... consciously agreed to the Amendment in its present
form. As a matter of fact, ... the House actually voted down a motion to make it read as it
does now." Id. at 101. The version approved by the House read as follows: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause .... "
Id. (emphasis added). The amendment reads as it does today because Representative Ben-
son of New York favored the substitution of the phrase "and no warrant shall issue" for
the phrase "by warrants issuing." He forwarded to the Senate his preferred version instead
of the version actually adopted by the House. No one seems to have noticed the change. Id.
at 101-02. If anything, the difference between the final version, with two clauses, and the
House version, with one, supports the argument that the first clause of the final version
should be read independently of the second. Id. at 103.
30 See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959).
31 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
32 See note 8 supra.
33 387 U.S. at 537.
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prior examination inspectors rarely possess sufficient information
to justify a belief that particular residences contain housing code
violations. Under the traditional standard of probable cause, an
inspector could almost never obtain a warrant; under a combina-
tion of that standard and the rule that warrantless searches are
inherently unreasonable, he could never perform an inspection
without the consent of the occupants. 34  For these reasons, the
Camara Court found that probable cause to search for housing
code violations exists "if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with re-
spect to a particular dwelling." 35 And most recently the Barlow's
Court required only '[a] warrant showing that a specific business
has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general
administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from
neutral sources." 
3 6
Criticism of this redefinition of probable cause does not stem
primarily from a concern that it will "lead to a weakening of the
fourth amendment's requirements in criminal cases." 37  Rather,
the critics have assailed the utility of warrants issued on a reduced
showing of probable cause. The Court has merely added an addi-
tional step to the inspection procedures without increasing protec-
tion for fourth amendment values.3 8 When the inspector seeks a
warrant, the magistrate weighs the governmental and individual
interests involved to determine whether probable cause exists.39
But he could perform the same task by determining simply
whether the inspection was reasonable. In the context of adminis-
trative searches, the warrant requirement adds little or no protec-
tion of privacy beyond that already provided by the fourth
amendment's reasonableness requirement.
The Supreme Court, however, views the warrant requirement
as performing several functions in the context of administrative
searches. Most importantly it limits the discretion of the inspector
to decide when, where and whom to search by committing this
decision to a neutral judicial officer. 40 The warrant also gives the
3' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
35 387 U.S. at 538.
11 436 U.S. at 321.
37 J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 261.
38 See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Clark, J.)
(condemning majority's authorization of "paper warrants" rubber-stamped by magistrate).
"' See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
40 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396-97 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
316-17 (1972); N. LAssoN, supra note 29, at 79-105.
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individual subject to inspection notice of the legality and scope of
the inspection 41 and may reduce the inspection's subjective intru-
siveness.4 2  Finally, requiring a warrant for administrative
searches avoids the anomaly of providing greater protection to
those suspected of crime than to ordinary citizens.43
Unfortunately, a warrant requirement for administrative
searches fails to perform all these functions. In particular, the
balance between the need to inspect and an individual's privacy
may result in such reduced standards for finding probable cause
that the magistrate can issue the warrant as a matter of course.
44
Moreover, the frequency of inspections performed by even a
single agency may encourage the use of routine procedures for
issuing inspection warrants, further reducing leeway for the
magistrate to exercise his independent judgment in individual
cases. 45  Some courts, attempting to avoid this result, have re-
quired the warrant application to contain a detailed description of
the reasons justifying an inspection. However, in light of the
41 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); Camara v, Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
42 For a discussion of the distinction between objective and subjective intrusiveness, see
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Objective intrusiveness may be
measured by such factors as whether the premises inspected are commercial or residential,
whether the inspection involves visual observation or physical examination, and whether
the inspection occurs during the day or at night. Subjective intrusiveness may be measured
by the degree of concern or fright a search is likely to generate in the person searched. Id.
at 558.
When confronted at the door by an inspector, many Americans are likely to demand a
warrant. Such demands ultimately led to the Supreme Court's decisions in Barlow's, Camara,
and See. If the inspector produces one, the ensuing search will probably seem less intrusive-
because it bears the stamp of judicial approval.
42 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); LaFave, Administrative
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 18
(1967).
"" See text accompanying note 38 supra; see also In re Establishment Inspection of Gil-
bert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1341-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (mere reference in war-
rant application to plan designed to reduce high incidence of occupational injuries in
foundry industry sufficient to establish probable cause for OSHA inspection); Marshall v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474, 484 n.9 (D.N.J. 1978) (dictum) (suggesting that ran-
dom selection of businesses for OSHA inspection sufficient to establish probable cause).
'5 In fiscal year 1977, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspected
59,932 workplaces. [1977] U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP. 48. In fiscal year 1976, the
figure was 90,369. [1976] U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP. 37. Cf Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE,
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 (4th ed. 1974) (Detroit police obtain fewer
than 2,000 search warrants annually); id. at 266 (San Francisco police obtained only 17
search warrants in 1966). These figures suggest that the vast majority of searches in the
criminal context are made under the various exceptions to the warrant requirement.
"6 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Establishment
Inspection of Northwest Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978).
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reduced probable cause standard applied to most administrative
searches, 47 this requirement seems largely a formality.48 At most,
it forestalls inspections authorized by the legislature only until in-
spectors learn what language to include in warrant applications.
Therefore, the discretion of the officer in the field has remained
effectively unhampered. In addition, if subjects of administrative
searches know how readily a warrant can be obtained under cur-
rent standards, their sense of subjective intrusiveness probably
remains high. Finally, the less stringent probable cause require-
ment for administrative search warrants preserves the anomaly of
greater protection for the criminal than for the ordinary citizen.
Difficulties with the warrant requirement arise in the context
of administrative searches because the requirement, even with a
flexible definition of probable cause, provides a relatively
"monolithic" response to the often delicate problem of balancing
governmental and individual interests. 49  A response better tai-
lored to all of society's needs seems possible. Because the Supreme
Court has emphasized the warrant as the primary criterion for a
constitutionally permissible search, it has ignored alternative
safeguards that might fairly protect privacy interests without bur-
dening inspection programs. Likewise, in the few cases in which
the Court has concluded that administrative searches do not re-
quire warrants, it has failed to consider the possibility of alterna-
tive safeguards. The development of a fresh response to the prob-
lems presented by administrative searches, however, requires an
examination of the cases dealing with fourth amendment limita-
tions on these searches.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's decisions concerning fourth amend-
ment limitations on administrative searches fall into three
4" See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
4' The Barlow's Court indicated that probable cause for OSHA inspections could rest
either on evidence of an existing violation, or on reasonable legislative or administrative
standards. 436 U.S. at 320. The rule evolving in the Seventh Circuit appears to be that
when an inspector relies on the first of these two possible grounds, his application must
allege more details than if he had relied on the second. Compare Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1979) with In re Establishment Inspection of Gil-
bert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1338-4 (7th Cir. 1979). If so, inspectors will
naturally rely more on the second ground, and thus avoid the more stringent requirements
of the first.
41 See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 388-90, 461 n.370.
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categories. The first category includes Camara,50 See v. City of Seat-
tle,5' and Barlow's.52 In these cases, the Court held that govern-
ment inspectors must generally obtain search warrants before they
may compel an individual to submit to inspection. The second
category includes Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States53 and
United States v. Biswell.54 Both cases involved inspections of closely
regulated businesses and the Court excepted the inspection of
these types of businesses from the warrant requirement. In the
third category, including United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 5- and
South Dakota v. Opperman,56 the Court found an exception to the
warrant requirement when administrative safeguards afford pro-
tection for privacy interests.
A. The Administrative Warrant Requirement -Camara, See, and
Barlow's
The first category of decisions illustrates the Supreme Court's
expansion of the warrant requirement into the field of adminis-
trative searches. 57  At one time, government inspections did not
require warrants if they were otherwise reasonable. 58  Then the
Camara Court held that the government could not require an in-
dividual to submit to a warrantless inspection of his residence for
housing code violations. In See, the warrant requirement was ex-
tended to inspections of business premises. Both cases employed a
balancing test in determining that a showing of "administrative"
probable cause would support issuance of a warrant and that the
warrant requirement would therefore not unduly burden the in-
spection programs. 59 Barlow's extended the warrant requirement
of Camara and See to inspections made under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).6 0
In requiring a warrant for administrative searches, the Court
has glossed over some serious practical and theoretical problems,
50 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
5" 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
52 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
53 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
54 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
55 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
56 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
5' See text accompanying note 30 supra.
58 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See also Ohio ex reL Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263 (1960).
5 See notes 16-35 and accompanying text supra.
60 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
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as discussed above. 61  In addition, the Barlow's Court discounted
Congress' finding that the success of OSHA depended upon sur-
prise inspections,6 2 creating an obvious disincentive for
businessmen to consent to warrantless inspections.63 The Court
disregarded the argument of the Barlow's dissent that the need for
warrantless inspections is empirical and that the Court should
therefore defer to Congress. 64  It also shunned the arguments
that "it is the general reasonableness standard in the first Clause,
not the Warrant Clause, that the Framers adopted to limit" ad-
ministrative searches, 65 and that requiring a "new fangled inspec-
tion warrant" would provide little added protection to privacy
interests of employers subject to OSHA inspections.
66
Despite their flaws, Camara, See, and Barlow's represent the
prevailing rule on the application of the warrant requirement to
administrative searches.6 7  Their failings appear more clearly
through a review of the exceptions to this general rule. Such a
review also serves to illustrate the advantages of focusing on the
reasonableness of a given search rather than on the warrant re-
quirement for administrative searches.
61 See notes 10-49 and accompanying text supra.
62 436 U.S. at 317. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1976) (imposing penalties for giving
advance notice of inspection).
63 436 U.S. at 316 n.l1. The Court has indicated that even where a warrant is required
for an administrative search, the inspector should generally seek a warrant only after a
request for entry has been refused. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
If an individual consents to a search, no warrant need be obtained, even in a criminal
investigation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
64 Justice Stevens, in dissent, chastised the majority for its position. 436 U.S. at 329-30.
The Court responded that it could only "await the development of evidence not present on
this record to determine how serious an impediment to effective enforcement [the lack of
surprise inspections] might be." Id. at 316-17 n.11.
6s 436 U.S. at 328. The Barlow's majority did suggest that the reasonableness of war-
rantless searches depends upon "the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of
each statute," (id. at 321), thus appearing to qualify the rule that warrantless searches are
inherently unreasonable (see text accompanying notes 17-20 supra).
66 Id. at 331-32.
67 Justice Powell has suggested extending the warrant procedure beyond its present
scope. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), he advocated the is-
suance of area search warrants permitting the Border Patrol "to conduct roving searches
on a particular road or roads for a reasonable period of time." Id. at 283 (concurring
opinion). Such warrants seem indistinguishable from the general warrants the fourth
amendment was meant to prohibit. See, e.g., J. LANDYNSKI, supra note I, at 45-46; N. LAs-
SON, supra note 29, at 120.
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B. An Exception for Closely Regulated Activity -Colonnade Catering
and Biswell
The second category of decisions concerning administrative
searches represents an exception to the warrant requirement for
searches of individuals and businesses already closely regulated or
supervised by the government. In these cases, the Court has rec-
ognized that the warrant requirement cannot apply to all adminis-
trative searches without seriously impairing government interests.
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 6  the Court upheld a
warrantless search of a liquor dealership because of the long his-
tory of government regulation of the liquor industry. 9 In United
States v. Biswell,70 the Court relied on Colonnade Catering in up-
holding the warrantless search of a gun dealership. Conceding
that interstate traffic in guns had a relatively short history of reg-
ulation, the Court instead emphasized the pervasiveness of the
regulation. 7' It concluded that anyone who enters into such a
business must know that he will be subject to inspection, and can
therefore be considered to have consented to it.72 The Court also
stressed that a statute specifically authorized warrantless in-
spections of gun dealers 7 3 and that alternative safeguards protect
the dealers.74  Each of these factors reduced the need for a war-
rant by duplicating the functions a warrant would have per-
formed. Simultaneously, each factor increased the reasonableness
of the warrantless inspection by limiting its infringement on indi-
vidual privacy. 75 The government also possesses a greater need
to inspect without a warrant than it did in either Camara or See.76
68 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
69 Id. at 77.
70 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
71 Id. at 315-16. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976) (Gun Control Act of 1968).
7? 406 U.S. at 316.
73 Id. at 317. But see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding statute
authorizing warrantless OSHA inspections unconstitutional).
74 The Court noted that each licensed dealer was "annually furnished with a revised
compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector's author-
ity." 406 U.S. at 316.
75 See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
76 See 406 U.S. at 316. The violations the inspectors were searching for in Camara, See,
and Barlow's were relatively difficult to conceal or correct quickly. Moreover, their correc-
tion would have accomplished the purposes of the codes and statutes the inspectors sought
to enforce, thus eliminating the need for inspection. In Biswell, on the other hand, the
violations for which the inspectors were searching, such as the possession and sale of
unregistered firearms, could be concealed quickly, and could be resumed immediately after
the inspector had left. Therefore, the need for surprise was great.
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Therefore, the Court found a warrant unnecessary for this type
of inspection."
The exception conceived of in Colonnade Catering and Biswell
was initially a narrow one. In both cases the Court could point to
restrictions imposed upon the inspections by statute or rule, which
contributed to their reasonableness.78  However, lower courts ap-
plying the exception have often failed to look beyond the mere
presence of extensive regulation. For example, Pollard v. Cockrell 
7 9
involved an ordinance authorizing the police to make warrantless
searches of massage parlors "for safety of structure and adequacy
of plumbing, ventilation, heating and illumination." 8 0  The court
upheld the ordinance on the ground that massage parlors are
pervasively regulated and that their owners, who must be licensed
to operate them, impliedly consent to such searches sA'
The Pollard decision seems unsound for a number of reasons.
The court looked only to the extent of regulation and the fact of
licensing. Without further analysis, it rested its holding on the fic-
tion of implied consent. However, both Colonnade Catering and
Biswell demonstrate that more is required for warrantless inspec-
tions to be reasonable .8  The Pollard court glossed over the fail-
ure of the ordinance to limit the discretion of the police to select
the time of inspection; it simply assumed that the police would
77 See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman involved a home visit to a
welfare recipient. Welfare recipients are subject to extensive government supervision, and
the Court therefore concluded that home visits have such a minor impact on privacy in-
terests that they are not searches restricted by the fourth amendment. Id. at 317-18. As-
suming alternatively that the visit was equivalent to a search, the Court found it to be a
reasonable one. Id. at 318. The Court emphasized that the visit was not a criminal investi-
gation, and was not made by the police, but by "a friend to one in need." Id. at 322-23. It
also emphasized the government's interest in assuring that the recipient used the assistance
he received for the purposes for which it was intended. Id. at 318-19. Finally, the Court
noted that "Mrs. James has the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the
form of cessation of aid ... flows from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and noth-
ing of constitutional magnitude is involved." Id. at 324. Thus relying on a notion of
consent similar to that in Colonnade Catering and Biswell, the Court held that a warrant for
such visits was unnecessary.
78 See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (although
warrant not required for inspection, statute does not permit forcible entry without war-
rant).
19 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1978) (upholding warrantless search of vessel by Coast Guard). But see United States v.
Piner, 452 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (suppressing evidence obtained through war-
rantless search of vessel by Coast Guard).
80 578 F.2d at 1014.
81 Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 371 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ind. 1978)).
82 See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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not abuse this discretion.83 Similarly, the court nearly ignored the
seeming anomaly of allowing the police to perform routine safety
inspections and the possibility that the true purpose of the
searches was not limited to their supposed administrative nature.
In any event, inspections by police officers inevitably involve greater
subjective intrusiveness than inspections by other government of-
ficials, 84 and the court failed to address this issue.
By considering only the presence of regulation and licensing,
the Pollard court overlooked several factors suggesting that the in-
trusiveness of these inspections outweighed the government's
need to inspect and that the inspections were therefore unreason-
able. Clearly, focusing on the degree of regulation alone provides
inadequate protection for privacy interests. In addition, it raises a
significant practical problem -numerous statutes authorize in-
spections in the context of widely differing regulatory programs.8"
To determine whether these inspections may be performed
without a warrant, courts must decide whether each in-
dustry is sufficiently regulated for the Colonnade Catering-Biswell
exception to apply. Such an approach produces inconsistency, or
at least uncertainty. 86  Focusing on the elements of the inspec-
11 578 F.2d at 1014-15. See note 42 supra (time of search as a measure of objective
intrusiveness).
84 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1971) (emphasizing that home visits not
made by police).
85 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 243 (1976) (authorizing inspection of licensed warehouses); 7
U.S.C. § 2046 (1976) (authorizing inspection of records of farm labor contractors); 10
U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1976) (authorizing inspection of plant and records of government con-
tractors and subcontractors); 15 U.S.C. § 1270(b) (1976) (authorizing inspection of estab-
lishments involved in manufacturing, processing, or handling of hazardous substances); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1915(b), 2005(c) (1976) (authorizing inspection of automobile factories); 15
U.S.C. § 2065(a) (1976) (authorizing inspection of establishments involved in manufactur-
ing consumer products); 16 U.S.C. § 956 (1976) (authorization to inspect catch and records
of fishing boats); 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1976) (authorizing inspection of establishments involved
in manufacturing, processing, or handling food, drugs, or cosmetics); 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a),
1267(b) (1976) (authorizing inspection of coal mines); 42 U.S.C. § 262(c) (1976) (authoriz-
ing inspection of establishments involved in manufacturing serum, toxin, antitoxin, vac-
cine); 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976) (authorization to inspect buildings, equipment, and rec-
ords of air carriers).
86 Compare United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 579 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1978) (re-
quiring warrants for search of coal mine office in light of Barlow's), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
836, 837 (1979) with In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301
(D.D.C. 1978) (upholding federal statute permitting warrantless searches of surface coal
mining operations and premises where records are required to be maintained because coal
industry more pervasively regulated than industries involved in Barlow's) and
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (warrantless
coal mine safety inspections constitutional because of pervasive regulation of industry);
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tions themselves, rather than on the vagaries of regulatory pro-
grams, could alleviate this problem.87
C. An Exception for Administrative Safeguards-Martinez-Fuerte and
Opperman
The third category of decisions concerning administrative
searches stands as another exception to the warrant requirement.
These cases suggest an approach to the problem that avoids the
difficulties of the exception for regulated activity. They focus not
on the extent of government regulation, but on the existence of
alternative administrative safeguards that protect privacy interests
as would a warrant.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 88 the Court upheld the
Border Patrol's practice of routinely stopping vehicles at fixed
checkpoints located near the border, and also held that the prac-
tice did not require a warrant. 89 The Court emphasized the im-
portance of the checkpoint stops to the enforcement of the im-
migration laws. It also stressed their limited intrusiveness, which
was due to the quite limited discretion of the officers in the field.
The location of the fixed checkpoints was not determined by
these officers, "but by officials responsible for making overall de-
cisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement
resources." 90 The Court also noted that "the visible manifesta-
tions of the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances" as would a warrant.9 1 Signifi-
compare United States v. Stanack Sales, 387 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding Colonnade
Catering-Biswell exception inapplicable to FDA's warrantless searches of prescription drug
repackagers) and United States v. Roux Laboratories, 456 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1978)
(holding Colonnade Catering-Biswell exception inapplicable to FDA's warrantless search of
hairdye manufacturer) with United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141
(N.D. Okla. 1973) (Colonnade Catering-Biswell exception applies to FDA's warrantless search
of warehouse for contaminated food) and United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co.,
345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (Colonnade Catering-Biswell exception applies to search of
bakery because food industry is pervasively regulated).
" See text accompanying note 108 infra.
88 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Martinez-Fuerte was the last in a series of cases involving chal-
lenges to different aspects of the Border Patrol's operations along the Mexican border. See
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (checkpoint searches permissible only on prob-
able cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving patrol stops
permissible only on reasonable suspicion); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (roving patrol searches permissible only on probable cause).
11 428 U.S. at 545.
90 Id. at 559.
91 Id. at 565.
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cantly, the Court found that when such alternative protections
exist, "deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of
higher ranking officials." 
92
South Dakota v. Opperman 93 adopted a similar approach in up-
holding inventory searches of automobiles in police custody. Not-
ing that "[tihe probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretak-
ing functions," 94 the Court emphasized that such inventories were
conducted according to standard procedures, presumably adopted
by higher ranking officials in the police department.9 5 The exist-
ence of such procedures gives courts a framework for determin-
ing whether searches conducted according to them are likely to
exceed the bounds of reasonableness. If not, the additional pro-
tection of a warrant seems unnecessary.
In this third category of decisions, courts permit warrantless
administrative searches if administrative procedures that limit the
possibility of arbitrariness otherwise assure their reasonableness.
This exception focuses on the reasonableness requirement itself,
rather than on the warrant requirement as does the first category
of decisions,96 or on extensive regulation as does the second.9 7 In
Delaware v. Prouse,98 the Supreme Court recently noted that:
[Tihe reasonableness standard usually requires ... that the
facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measure-
ment against "an objective standard," whether this be probable
cause or a less stringent test. In those situations in which the
balance of interests precludes insistence upon "some quantum
of individualized suspicion," other safeguards are generally re-
lied upon to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in the
field" ... 9
A rule permitting such alternative safeguards offers several
advantages. First, it avoids imposing the warrant requirement
when it is unnecessary. In addition, it encourages the develop-
ment of alternative safeguards even for cases falling within the
92 Id. at 566.
93 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
91 Id. at 370 n.5.
95 Id. at 374-75.
91 See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
97 See notes 68-86 and accompanying text supra.
98 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
11 Id. at 1396-97 (footnotes omitted).
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exception for regulated activity. Ultimately it promotes fourth
amendment values by bringing coherence to this area of the law,
because it, when combined with the views of the Barlow's dissent-
ers, provides the basis for a general alternative to the warrant
requirement in the context of administrative searches.
III
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. 00 If
warrantless searches are inherently unreasonable, the task of de-
ciding which searches are reasonable and thus permissible falls
exclusively to the courts, because only courts issue warrants. If,
however, searches conducted according to procedures affording
alternative safeguards are also reasonable, the legislature and ad-
ministrative agencies would play a role in deciding what searches
would take place.
That role would be determined by the superior fact-finding
capabilities of legislatures and agencies. Not only is a legislature
generally better equipped than a court to find facts,' 0 ' but it is
also better equipped to characterize them and to strike a balance
between conflicting interests based on this characterization. 10 2 The
legislature would be free to decide whether a particular
safeguard, such as the warrant requirement, is in fact reasonable,
or whether other safeguards might also make the search reason-
able. The courts would exercise ultimate control over the extent
of government intrusion on individual privacy by defining the
term "unreasonable search."103
Instead of requiring a warrant for all administrative searches,
the courts should do so only when advance judicial approval is
essential to make the search reasonable. Searches that are espe-
cially intrusive would require this approval.10 4  In effect, the
courts would hold that no degree of administrative safeguards
could outweigh the intrusiveness of searches falling into this
category.' 0 5
10 See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
101 Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 209
(1971).
102 Id. at 234.
103 The interpretation of the language of the Constitution is the role assigned to the
courts in the constitutional plan. See id. at 199-200.
104 See notes 8, 21 supra.
105 See Bacigal, supra note 8, at 568-73. Bacigal identifies three categories of searches:
"Searches Applied Openly and Uniformly to All Citizens"; "Searches Focused on an Indi-
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Because of their routine character, however, most administra-
tive searches would not fall into this category. Therefore, in the
context of these searches, the courts should abandon the view that
warrantless searches are inherently unreasonable. Instead, they
should identify the proper functions of a warrant, and determine
whether these functions are performed by other safeguards con-
tained in the statute or regulation authorizing the search. If they
are, the search is a reasonable one and is permissible. If not, the
courts should still refrain from imposing a warrant requirement.
Instead, they should simply rule that the search as presently lim-
ited is an unreasonable one, and then permit the legislature to
devise protections making the search a reasonable one.
This alternative to the problem of reconciling the need to in-
spect with the right to privacy has several advantages. As already
suggested, it would avoid the inconvenience of requiring unneces-
sary warrants. In addition, rather than the "all or nothing" results
of a warrant requirement,10 6 the proposed solution would afford
needed flexibility in responding to the problem of balancing the
interests of the government and the individual.10 7  Thus, the
need for a regulated activity exception would diminish; adminis-
trative safeguards offering greater protection without the disad-
vantages of the warrant procedure would replace it. Finally, this
approach would bring relative certainty to this area of the law.
The proper procedures for conducting an inspection would, in
most cases, appear in the statute or rule authorizing it rather than
in a court decision that may not apply beyond its own facts.' 08 And
rather than three different approaches to fourth amendment
limitations on administrative searches, there would be only one.
Alternative legislated safeguards could also satisfy the four
functions that the Supreme Court has stated an administrative
search warrant should perform. 0 9 First, it would limit the discre-
vidual Citizen"; and "Searches Directed Against Groups or Classes of Citizens." Id. at 565-
79. He argues that searches focusing on individual citizens require more justification than
the other categories because they are the most likely to be arbitrary and oppressive. Id. at
569-72. Therefore, while public opinion may provide sufficient protection against the first
category of searches, and administrative rules sufficient protection against the third, only
the warrant requirement provides sufficient protection against the second. Id. at 571-72.
106 See note 49 and accompanying text supra. Compare notes 57-67 and accompanying
text supra with notes 68-86 and accompanying text supra.
107 See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 221, 240 (1973).
'08 See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
1I See generally notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 64:856
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
tion of the inspection officer by placing the inspection decision in
the hands of senior officials. 110 The officers in the field could
receive this decision in the form of a mandatory inspection
plan."' Second, notice of the inspection's legality could be given
by providing the inspector with "visible manifestations" of his au-
thority and by providing an opportunity for the person subject to
inspection to check with the inspector's superior."' Similarly,
notice of the inspection's scope could be afforded by a copy of the
officially prescribed limitations. 13  Ideally, the person would also
receive this notice of the inspection before it occurs. If surprise is
needed, the notice could state that an inspection is planned but
omit the date of the inspection. In many cases, such a notice
might itself provoke corrective action, thus accomplishing with less
effort and confrontation the same objective as would an actual
inspection. Moreover, this notice would allow the person subject
to inspection an opportunity to obtain a hearing on any objections
concerning the proposed inspection without risking possible crim-
inal liability for refusing to permit the inspection. 1 4  In either
event, such a procedure would be more administratively efficient
than the search warrant requirement.
The third and fourth functions of an administrative search
warrant might prove more difficult to satisfy by alternative means.
In most cases, advance notice should reduce the subjective intru-
siveness of the inspection, especially if the person subject to in-
spection receives some choice about the inspection's timing. If in
some cases this alternative proves insufficient, only then should
the warrant requirement apply. Regarding the fourth function,
the proposed approach might afford ordinary citizens fewer pro-
tections than suspected criminals. However, it affords them all the
protection required under the circumstances. It seems strange to
110 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
111 Cf Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 320-21 (probable cause established by show-
ing selection of business for inspection on basis of "general administrative plan ... derived
from neutral sources"); Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978)
(describing OSHA plan in detail and indicating plan not always followed).
11. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 549 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Clark, J.).
Examples of such visible manifestations might be a uniform, a badge, and a copy of the
regulations governing searches.
"' See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
14 See LaFave, supra note 43, at 30-34. Under current practice, an inspector must first
request permission to enter before applying for a warrant. See note 63 supra. Such a re-
quest also gives the person to be inspected an opportunity to obtain a hearing, assuming he
realizes that the inspector will return with a warrant the next time.
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insist on greater protection in all cases when such protection is
actually necessary only in some.
Admittedly, Congress has not yet adopted any alternative
schemes providing safeguards comparable to the ones proposed
by this Note."15 But it has had little incentive to do so. Congress
would probably be more responsive if the Court were to rule, as it
could have in Barlow's, that the legislature has responsibility to
adopt such alternative schemes for warrantless inspections." 6
Congress, however, may never have the opportunity to assume
this responsibility.
CONCLUSION
In applying the fourth amendment to inspections and ad-
ministrative searches, the Supreme Court has focused on the
amendment's warrant requirement rather than its requirement
that searches be reasonable. However, the warrant requirement
has proved ill-suited to inspection programs. Exceptions have
developed, but these exceptions are inadequate in scope.
Furthermore, they do not assure that inspections falling within
the excepted categories will be reasonable, and they have led to
uncertainty concerning the need for a warrant in particular situa-
tions. A solution more consistent with the role of courts and legis-
latures in our system of government would be to permit reason-
able inspections if the legislature provides alternative safeguards to
take the place of the warrant requirement.
Kevin I. MacKenzie
1" See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 150ff, 2806 (1976) (codifying prevailing rule); 15 U.S.C. § 1990e
(1976) (requiring administrative warrants); 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976) (requiring that in-
spection be reasonable); 21 U.S.C. § 880(d) (1976) (defining probable cause); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3611(a) (1976) (requiring compliance with fourth amendment).
116 See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 27-30 (historically, judicial decisions provoked Par-
liamentary action to curtail general warrant); Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 379 (suggesting
that only courts can provoke legislature to act). See generally Monaghan, Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1975).
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